黨國意識形態就是那個年代的產物，舉例說，當年「中國式的情報」如George H. Kerr.在《Formosa Betrayed》所說，中國軍人提供給美軍的二戰時台灣情報，竟然是他們自己幻想地而且跟現實差很多，如說某某港口完全沒船等，美軍偵察機一看發現不得了那個港口滿滿是船而且超活躍，甚至中國人還自己幻想出一個不存在的島嶼，甚至拿清朝時期對台灣的認知來幻想情報 (如原住民控制區不再管轄範圍等等)，這可是戰爭的情報部門喔，表示當代中國人是缺乏精準敘事和思考、邏輯推論的能力。
我補充說，中華民國一直把台灣1950年代的極端貧困說是二戰破壞，但根據美國當年駐台副領事美國白人 George H. Kerr 所寫的書籍《Formosa Betrayed》說，當時台灣基礎設施雖被破壞，但工廠等大多數保持良好，理當可以迅速重建起來。真正導致台灣從戰前亞洲先進之列 (要質疑來源的話這是美國人說的喔，以及台灣學界最近也靠攏向這派) ，倒成1950年代的貧困事實上是中國民國在台灣的劫掠壓榨，比如大量拆卸工廠物資設備去上海變賣導致大量企業消失 (1930年代後台灣是日本前進南洋的「工業重鎮」，如李國鼎1951年任職的台船公司就是掠奪自日治時期的台灣船渠株式會社，請注意這是歷史課本說不存在於當年台灣的「重工業」
United States Policy Toward Formosa and the Pescadores
It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in NSC 37/1, 37/2 and 37/5 will attain our major objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores—the denial of the islands to the Communists through their separation from Chinese mainland control. The situation in Formosa and the Pescadores is degenerating along lines which probably, though perhaps not for two or three years or perhaps in a matter of months, will culminate in Chinese Communist domination of the islands. A review of our policy is therefore in order.
(註：NSC=National Security Council，美國國家安全議會，為協助美國總統處理外交和安全議題的極高層組織，主席為美國總統
It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist administrators from the islands and in establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.
Either would confront us with the eventual probable responsibility for removing the Chinese forces and many of the Chinese refugees by force to the mainland. This would involve a considerable amount of pushing people around, which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral conflicts within our own people and government.
[Washington,] July 6, 1949.
Draft Memorandum Prepared in Policy Planning Staff
[Washington,] June 23, 1949.
A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Pescadores
1. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles: (a) there are now approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such action and (b) this Government is more or less committed to Chinese sovereignty over the islands.
2. This paper does not attempt to provide a solution to the first of these obstacles. The answer to that question turns, in the last analysis, on whether the National Military Establishment is able and willing, on much the same principles which animated the British at Oran and Dakar, to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist forces now on the islands and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. For these reasons, this plan cannot be implemented unless the NME indicates such readiness and ability.
這份報告不對第一個障礙提供解答，那些答案根據最後的分析是 National Military Establishment(國家軍事
3. This paper does explore the possibilities for overcoming the political obstacles which stand in our way and for providing a justifiable political framework within which this Government might resort to a show of force or, if necessary, an active exercise of force in bringing about an administration independent of Chinese mainland control and enjoying solid anti-Communist popular support.
4. The recommendations which follow are suggestive rather than definitive. The general course of action being proposed here is so complex and full of unpredictable elements that, if accepted, it should be implemented with intelligent flexibility.
Course of Action
5. An inquiry should be instituted, along the lines of paragraph 2 above, as to whether the NME is able and willing to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist troops now on the islands, and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. While awaiting a reply from the NME, we should: a. unofficially, through an existing cut-out, sound out the Philippine Government in guarded terms slanted to its own interests regarding the proposed course of action set forth in paragraph 8
(The Filipinos are naturally going to be most reluctant to place themselves out in front on this score unless this Government gives them a greater sense of security against external attack.); (非正式的，試探菲律賓政府在這方面(我的註解：移除在台的中國人政權)的意向) b. in no-wise committing this Government, indirectly approach the Australian Government along the same lines;(試探澳大利亞政府同樣(我的註解：移除福爾摩沙的中國人政權)的事項) c. even more cautiously and tentatively explore the attitude of the Indian Government;(更小心且試探性的探究印度政府對此事的態度)
d. prepare a chapter in the White Paper on China dealing with Formosa,86 with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands since VJ–Day (The White Paper, or at least the chapter on Formosa, should be issued before action is taken along the lines laid down in paragraph 7.); (在白皮書中增加福爾摩沙章節，強調中國人自從VJ-DAY後在島上的暴政)
e. release for background purposes a small but steady stream of information of this character and information regarding the Formosan reemancipation movement.
6. If the reactions from all three Governments are negative, we should reexamine this paper in the light of what has been learned.
7. If the reactions are affirmative and if the NME expresses a willingness to make a show of force adequate to eliminate Nationalist troops from Formosa and the Pescadores, and if necessary to apply it, we should forthwith
a. secretly and officially discuss with the Filipinos, Australians and, if progress has been made with Nehru,87 the Indian
s, the questions which were raised with them through informal contacts. We should state that if any one or all of them would take the initiative in the matter we would be prepared to support them and follow through on a practical basis. At this stage, the British, Canadians and New Zealanders
should be secretly advised of these conversations;
b. If there is general concurrence among the Philippine, Australian and Indian Governments
that all or any one of them would raise the Formosan question as an issue requiring the attention of the powers which defeated Japan,† make our position clear along the lines set forth in the following paragraph.
8. In our view the problem of Formosa and the Pescadores can be broken down into two main components(福爾摩沙和澎湖問題可以被分解為兩個成分): (a) the need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the present period (在這時期需要一個穩固且負責的統治當局) while they are awaiting a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese peace settlement (當他們仍在等待中國局勢穩定以及最終處置的對日和約) ,
and (b) the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to their future(島民對自己未來的渴望必須被重視) so that a just and constructive decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the self-determination(民族自決) of the inhabitants of Formosa and the Pescadores.
We do not feel that we should take the initiative in seeking a solution of these issues because (a) they are of more vital concern to the Philippines and its neighbors than to us, (b) were we to do so, we would lay ourselves open to charges of “Big Power intervention” and (c) our hands are more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in facilitating Chinese assmption of control over the islands. While we are most reluctant to take the lead in this question, we will vigorously and fully support those states which will take action along the following lines:
a. Notification to all other powers at war with Japan that: The notifying states view with grave anxiety the mounting threat of chaos and civil strife spreading from the mainland of China to Formosa and the Pescadores(通知所有和日本作戰過的政權有關嚴重的焦慮，中國大陸的內戰和混亂正在被散布到福爾摩沙和澎湖列島)
; the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and ravaged from those islands; the notifying powers cannot view without misgivings this new jeopardization of the security of all Southeast Asia; they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter
,88 this question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan. The foregoing notification should be released for publication.
b. Either in the same notification or in a separate statement to be issued simultaneously or shortly thereafter by all or any one of the above-mentioned notifying governments, the proposal should be made that, in view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores(福爾摩沙和澎湖早期獨立的歷史), of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese (中國人過去四年來在島上令人震驚的的暴政紀錄) and of the many pleas from repesentative Formosans for autonomy (以及許多典型的「福爾摩沙人」的自治請求), the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite(公民投票) regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination(民族自決，整句意思為，擊敗日本的強權們應該迅速地要求聯合國在一年內按照「民族自決」的原則在島上舉辦「公民投票」作為「最終處置」)(我的註解：這就是黨國中華民國最恨要判死刑的台獨).
It should be further proposed that the U.N. be requested in conducting the plebiscite to place the following alternatives before the inhabitants of the islands:(聯合國應該進一步為島上住民舉辦這些選項的「公民投票」) (1) Do you wish to be administered by (a) whatever government emerges on the mainland of China or (b) the present Chinese authorities on the island, or(你希望被「無論」中國大陸出現什麼政府或現行島上的中國人政權統治，「或」)
(2) Do you wish another form of administration: (a) trusteeship under the United Nations, (b) independence, (c) any other?(你希望被另一個統治機構：(a)聯合國託管 (b)獨立 (c) 任何其他？)
These proposals should likewise be made public.
9. The day following the notification recommended in paragraph 8, this Government should:
a. propose to the concerned governments (and announce publicly) that representatives of the states at war with Japan meet within one week’s time at Manila or Canberra to act on the notification (Objections may be raised to this proposal on the basis of inconvenience. Having made it, however, we can then acquiesce to a conference of Ambassadors in Washington or London.);
b. announce publicly our reaction to the notification: (1) The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(2) Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military administration because the United States Government enabled the Chinese authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by the President in the Cairo Declaration;(中國人在那裏是因為開羅宣言，所以美國讓中國人去接受台澎列島的日軍投降)
(3) Subsequent events in China and in Formosa have not justified the assumptions on which these actions were taken: Chinese administration(中國統治當局) on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive(貪婪的暴政) and the chaos and strife(混亂和傷害) which wracked and gutted China Proper now threaten to engulf these islands;
(4) It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure (這並不是耗費大量鮮血和資金去解放福爾摩沙和澎湖的美國人民想看到的), that the Cairo Declaration and this Government’s action in facilitating Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;(開羅宣言和「這個(美國)政府」允許中國人統治這些島嶼的結果，已經危及到東南亞的穩定和安全，並且在過去四年裡讓福爾摩沙的人民受難)
(5) Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative Formosans to this Government;(希望島上的中國管理當局可以「轉向」更負責任且建設性的政策
(6) Confronted with further deterioration rather than improvement and with the likelihood that the strife and misery on the Chinese mainland will spread to Formosa and the Pescadores, this Government can no longer in good conscience remain silent and inactive;(面對情況的惡化而不是改善，以及中國大陸上的衝突和不幸將會擴散到福爾摩沙和澎湖的可能，本(美)政府在良心驅使下無法再保持沉默和不作為。)
(7) In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the concerned powers regarding (a) the occupation and administration of the islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and (b) the future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed plebiscite.(鑒於以上所有情況，「(美國)本政府」宣布決定聯合多數對島上與對日和約完成前的佔領和管理現狀感到擔憂的政權，這些島嶼的未來必須透過全民公投來決定
10. Simultaneously, we should prepare with utmost despatch and vigor to lay the groundwork for the meeting of the concerned powers. We should attempt to obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands, acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians, Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces available for the military operation.(多國共同出兵來進行這個軍事行動)
11. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts, publications, … and other channels.…
12. At the meeting of the concerned powers, we should endeavor to insure that the change-over on the islands be undertaken two weeks from the convocation of the meeting. Details regarding the forthcoming operation should be decided upon at the meeting. If China and the U.S.S.R. are represented at the conference, it will be necessary to conduct the work of the conference outside of the formal conference sessions which should then be devoted only to forcing through agreed positions at the most rapid possible pace.
13. As soon as decisions to that effect are reached at the conference, we should establish naval and air patrols designed to prevent access to the islands from the mainland. At the same time, we should do everything possible to facilitate the flight elsewhere of undesirable Chinese political and military elements now on the islands, including ships to speed the exodus.(在會議中作成決定後，我們必須立刻動用海上和空中巡邏來阻止大陸對這些島嶼的侵入。同時，我們必須動用可能的每件東西來遣送這島上「不受歡迎的」中國政治和軍事元素，包括船隻來加速移送。)
14. At this time, we should despatch an emissary to the key personality on the island, General Sun Li-jen. Because Sun, of all the generals on the island, has the least hopes on the mainland and is the most likely to resist a change imposed from without, he is capable of performing the desperate act of resisting vigorously. It would be judicious to present him with an opportunity for saving his position. He should be offered the alternative of declaring himself in favor of the Formosan cause and participating in the new occupation. If he accepts, we shall have made a major military gain in dividing the Chinese forces now on the island.(說拉攏孫立人然後可以得到現成的軍隊在福爾摩沙島上，我晚點有空在翻譯這段)15. The Generalissimo(大元帥，說蔣介石) should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.(如果他願意留在島上，他可以獲得政治難民身分)(美國對1945~1949年的中國來台尋求庇護者都稱為"refugee"，意思為難民)
16. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should always remember that our aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral heavy-handed measures.
81 This memorandum, PPS 53, according to an attached chit, was canceled on July 6; a note stated that the views of the Policy Planning Staff would be submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in Department of State files.
82 January 19, p. 270.
83 February 3, p. 281.
84 March 1, p. 290.
* “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff of the opinion that any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might, particularly in view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps have failed, lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.” (NSC 37/3, February 11, 1949.) [Footnote in the source text.]
85 National Military Establishment.
86 See Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 307; see also post, pp. 1365 ff.
87 Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.
† As used in this paper “the powers which defeated Japan” and “the powers at war with Japan” refer only to those represented on the Far Eastern Commission: US, UK, USSR, China, Philippines, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Netherlands, France—plus Pakistan and Burma. [Footnote in the source text.]
88 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, 1053.